Modern vehicles rely on hundreds of on-board electronic control units (ECUs) communicating over in-vehicle networks. As external interfaces to the car control networks (such as the on-board diagnostic (OBD) port, auxiliary media ports, etc.) become common, and vehicle-to-vehicle / vehicle-to-infrastructure technology is in the near future, the a ack surface for vehicles grows, exposing control networks to potentially life-critical a acks. is paper addresses the need for securing the controller area network (CAN) bus by detecting anomalous tra c pa erns via unusual refresh rates of certain commands. While previous works have identi ed signal frequency as an important feature for CAN bus intrusion detection, this paper provides the rst such algorithm with experiments using three a acks in ve (total) scenarios. Our data-driven anomaly detection algorithm requires only ve seconds of training time (on normal data) and achieves true positive / false discovery rates of 0.9998/0.00298, respectively (micro-averaged across the ve experimental tests).
INTRODUCTION
A modern vehicle relies on scores of engine control units (ECUs), which are embedded computers controlling the vehicle's many subsystems. Because of the number of ECUs, dedicated connections for all ECU tra c is unfeasible and a single bus allowing all signals to be broadcast to all ECUs is standard. In particular, we focus on the high-speed (125Kbs-1Mbs) controller area network (CAN) bus used for much of modern vehicle communications. Because ECUs control most of the vehicle's functions (sensors, lights, braking, etc.), it follows that adversarial manipulation of signals on the CAN bus has potentially severe consequences. Exacerbating the potential for interference is the proliferation of external connections with the vehicle control network, including USB ports, WiFi, Bluetooth, and the mandatory on-board diagnostic (OBD-II) port that gives direct access to vehicle buses. Near-future advancements, including vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure wireless communication, increase the need for vehicle network security. Protecting these critical control networks has led to increasing study of their vulnerabilities and mitigations for those vulnerabilities. [2, 9, 10] CAN bus signals are indexed by a process ID (PID), speci ed in the packet header, and are generally associated with a xed function (running lights, sensors, door locks, etc.) e speci c PID-to-function mapping of signals is dependent on the make and model; e.g., signals with PID 3A1 may code for the brake lights in one make/model, but something di erent in another. is mapping poses problems for creating universally e ective o ensive and defensive cyber capabilities.
is work relies on the observation that most PID signals are sent regularly and redundantly. Command injection a ackers for these PIDs' functions, therefore, need to produce regular, redundant signal injections to achieve a desired response in the vehicle's actions, and we de ne this class of a acks as regular-frequency signal injection a acks. Our hypothesis is that by modeling and detecting anomalies in the inter-signal wait times we can exploit the regularity of the CAN bus signals and can produce an accurate detection capability for this well-de ned class of a acks.
To test our proposed detector, we de ne and execute three signal injection a acks.
is serves to illuminate both the ease of execution and the potential for danger of these a acks. We present accuracy results of the detector under both normal (non-a ack) and a ack conditions. Rather than disclose details of vulnerabilities exploited, we have informed the vendor. For this reason the make, model, and production year of the testing car, as well as the injected PIDs and values, are not included.
Our detector does not require labeled a ack data, and only requires a few seconds of normal (non-a ack) CAN bus observations to train. Unlike signature-based detection methods, our system promises defense against novel a acks; more explicitly, our system is designed to detect any a ack that disrupts the frequency of the CAN bus packets. Our initial empirical results support this goal with near perfect true positive and false detection rates. Because it depends only on the regularity of the inter-signal arrival times, the detection capability eliminates the need to reverse engineer the signal-to-e ect mapping of the CAN signals for each make and model. Although outside the scope of this paper, we have begun engineering work to create a prototype (a ermarket) detection technology using the OBD-II plugin running our algorithm and illuminating lights to indicate anomalies in CAN signals' frequency.
Related Work
Our implementation of the signal injection a acks used an Arduino board connected to the vehicle via the OBD-II port, allowing remote access via bluetooth. Previous implementations of signal injection a acks both wireless and otherwise (similar to ours) are found throughout the literature [2] [3] [4] . Vehicle network intrusion detection, particularly, via anomaly detection, is an emerging area of research [3, 5, 6, 8] . Both Hoppe et al. [3] and and Müter et al. [7] identify CAN bus signal frequency as an important feature for signal injection detection, but no algorithm, detection experiments, or accuracy results are presented. is work presents the rst detailed signal-frequency-based CAN-bus anomaly detection algorithm with experimental results. Broster et al. [1] develop a general system for detecting babbling node failures on event-triggered systems (in particular CAN) by knowing a priori timing constraints between signal triggers and infer if the constraints are broken from observed signal times. While our method leverages timing of signals, it requires no a priori system-speci c knowledge and targets a more general class of a acks but is CAN speci c.
REGULARITY OF SIGNAL FREQUENCY
Analyzing the CAN bus signals for normal se ings (50s-25s with car on and engine o , plus 25s with car on and engine on), we make a few critical observations. First, nearly all (110 of 120 observed) PIDs' signals are regularly occurring, meaning that for a xed id a signal is sent repeatedly at a xed rate with li le noise. As a speci c example, the runtime lights signal is sent at a xed interval with one of two values, indicating on/o ; hence, even when not in use, the lights singal is sent. Explicitly, our observation on this regularity is that the time between signals (referred to as inter-signal arrival time or wait time) never di ers more than a 24% from expectation, where expectation is computed as the mean of the observations. See Figure 1 . Additionally, Figure 1 gives a histogram of the 117 (of 120) PIDs whose signals occur at a frequency greater than 1hz. e takeaway from these two histograms is that the vast majority of PID signals occur regularly, with nearly xed frequency, and at a relatively high rate.
Following our observations during testing, we assume the value of a function remains constant until receipt of a signal with a new value. Consequently, an adversary that wishes to control a subsystem via CAN bus signal injection must send the appropriate signals (PID and value) at a rate at least as fast as that process's ambient signal rate to sustain the desired value. With this motivation, we de ne a "regular-frequency signal injection a ack" as a repeated injection of a CAN bus signal with xed PID and at a rate greater than or equal to the expected rate of that signal.
HYPOTHESIS, DETECTOR, & EXPERIMENT
In light of the regularity of signal frequencies, we hypothesize that a simple anomaly detection system monitoring the inter-signal wait times of CAN bus tra c will provide accurate detection of a regular-frequency signal injection a acks. As a proof of concept we present an experiment using three a acks during two normal vehicle operation modes, engine on/o . e rst (respectively, second) a ack turns runtime lights (respectively, reverse lights) from on (normal) to o (a ack). ese two a acks operate by repeatedly injecting the desired signal into the CAN bus at a rate high enough to suppress the ambient signal also sent regularly by the car; hence these are regular-frequency signal injection a acks by necessity.
ese two a acks are designed to be covert, changing the car's actions without the driver knowing, and their success was easily empirically veri able. e third a ack is a (less stealthy) denial-ofservice (DOS) a ack we discovered, which upon repeated signal injection of a particular signal, forces the car to turn o . See caption in Figure 3 for more description. Our experimentation reveals that the successful DOS (the car shu ing o ) by this particular signal also requires a regular-frequency signal injection. Finally, we note that our hardware implementation allowed blue-tooth connection to the Arduino board and, therefore, is triggerable from outside the vehicle. e simplicity of the hardware and the a ack illustrates the ease with which a car can be compromised (provided an adversary could at some point access the OBD-II port near the steering column). In particular it demonstrates the urgent need for intrusion detection and prevention capabilities in this space.
Modelling Inter-Signal Arrival Times
It is natural to model each PID's signal occurrence times as samples of a stationary, Markov process-i.e., the time of a signal only depends on the time of the previous signal, and this wait time follows a xed distribution. To do so, we estimate the wait-time distribution from observations and nd that these distributions are very dissimilar across processes. See gure 2. In particular, this disparity dissuades us from simply ing a Gaussian and identifying wait times with low z-score. Rather we exploit the relative regularity of the signals by using the percent of absolute error of an observed wait time from expectation.
Explicitly, we build an anomaly detector for each PID's signal stream. To train the models, we simply observe a few seconds of CAN data, and for each PID record the times that processes' signals occur. Denote the signal times for a given PID t 0 , t 1 , ..., t n , so we have observed n wait times, namely, ∆ 1 := t 1 − t 0 , ..., ∆ n := t n − t n−1 . From the {∆ i } i we nd the maximum observed error from expectation, m := max i |∆ i − µ | where µ := i ∆ i /n, and set the threshold for absolute error from expectation as m plus 15% of µ.
at is, future observations are agged if the time between signals di ers in absolute value from the expected wait time by more than α := m + 0.15 * µ. By design if two ECUs send CAN signals at the same time, the signal with lower PID (3-digit hex) takes precedence; hence, a dropped signal and, therefore, doubled wait time will occur on occasion. To accommodate this feature and limit false positives, we require three agged wait times consecutively to issue an alert.
Altogether there are 120 models (one for each PID); each will ag unusually short/long inter-signal times and produce an alert upon three consecutive anomalies. For successful results, our method depends on the few seconds of training observations being normal, i.e., with no a acks present.
Experiment & Results
Here we present our rst tests of the above anomaly detector. Each data set includes one of the three aforementioned regular-frequency signal injection a acks occurring for about 29-45s and surrounded by normal (non-a ack) data. Figure 3 gives details of the ve test sets and results. For each data set, only the rst ve seconds of normal data is used to train the models, then anomaly detection as described above is run. Recall that each CAN bus packet is agged as anomalous if and only if the wait time between it and the last signal with that PID is too long/short, and an alert is raised if and only if a packet is the third consecutive anomalous packet with that PID. To display the results in Figure 3 we count and plot the number of alerts in each .025s. non-overlapping time window. Micro-averaged rates are as follows: true positive rate = 0.9998, false positive rate = 0.00294, false detection rate = 0.00298. 1 
CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK
Our initial investigations of CAN bus tra c have concluded that conditioned on PIDs, the signals are exceptionally regular in frequency while still exhibiting a wide variety of wait-time distributions. Most notably, we have two identi ed notable consequences of this regularity, namely, (1) that many signal injection a acks require repeated injections to be e ective, and (2) that the regularity of normal signals admits an exceptionally accurate anomaly detection capability. Our initial experimental results tested two covert and one DOS a ack that all require regular-frequency signal injections. In light of the plots of Figure 3 it is clear that any of the the three a acks used in this experiment are nearly immediately identi able by the prolonged series of alerts, and we believe this near perfect detection capability to apply any sustained regularfrequency signal injection a ack. We conclude that our approach is a promising avenue for accurate detection of an important class of CAN bus a acks.
While signi cant progress has been realized in our detection capabilities, tweaking and hardening the algorithm is necessary for transition to practice; e.g., understanding if/when an ECU can experience a non-malicous change of state that changes its signal frequency. Future mathematical investigations of the speed of convergence of empirical distributions will lead to theorem-driven, principled choices for currently manually-tuned parameters (e.g., thresholds, training time). Experiments with a larger number of a acks and wider variety of a acks is necessary. Finally, exploring a er-market hardware/so ware solutions for deployment are needed for transition.
Future work will focus on extending this solution to rapidly address a wider array of vehicles.
is e ort will employ two di erent approaches: 1) improving the e ciency of "learning" the e total number of anomalies in each 0.025s interval is plotted. Micro-averaged rates are as follows: true positive rate = 0.9998, false positive rate = 0.00294, false detection rate = 0.00298. necessary subset of CAN bus commands (PIDs) and payload values for a new vehicle (e.g., a new 2018 model) and 2) developing cyber detection algorithms that are more generalized, and thus reduce the need for exhaustive detailed knowledge of each proprietary system. e e orts to improve the learning time required for each new vehicle will focus on advances in machine learning methods coupled with the inclusion of heuristics developed from the study of a wide variety of current vehicles. One such method is a localized version of war-driving that is currently being tailored to rst identify the more detrimental a ack e ects (e.g., engine speed) and then determine all combinations of PIDs, payloads and inter-command timings that can cause that e ect.
